Cognitive Biases and Organizational Correctives: Do Both Disease and Cure Depend on the Politics of the Beholder? by Tetlock, Philip E
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Management Papers Wharton Faculty Research
6-2000
Cognitive Biases and Organizational Correctives:
Do Both Disease and Cure Depend on the Politics
of the Beholder?
Philip E. Tetlock
University of Pennsylvania
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/mgmt_papers
Part of the Business Intelligence Commons, Cognition and Perception Commons, Cognitive
Psychology Commons, Experimental Analysis of Behavior Commons, Management Information
Systems Commons, and the Management Sciences and Quantitative Methods Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/mgmt_papers/337
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Tetlock, P. E. (2000). Cognitive Biases and Organizational Correctives: Do Both Disease and Cure Depend on the Politics of the
Beholder?. Administrative Science Quarterly, 45 (2), 293-326. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2667073
Cognitive Biases and Organizational Correctives: Do Both Disease and
Cure Depend on the Politics of the Beholder?
Abstract
The study reported here assessed the impact of managers' philosophies of human nature on their reactions to
influential academic claims and counter-claims of when human judgment is likely to stray from rational-actor
standards and of how organizations can correct these biases. Managers evaluated scenarios that depicted
decision-making processes at micro, meso, and macro levels of analysis: alleged cognitive biases of individuals,
strategies of structuring and coping with accountability relationships between supervisors and employees, and
strategies that corporate entities use to cope with accountability demands from the broader society. Political
ideology and cognitive style emerged as consistent predictors of the value spins that managers placed on
decisions at all three levels of analysis. Specifically, conservative managers with strong preferences for
cognitive closure were most likely (a) to defend simple heuristic-driven errors such as overattribution and
overconfidence and to warn of the mirror-image mistakes of failing to hold people accountable and of diluting
sound policies with irrelevant side-objectives; (b) to be skeptical of complex strategies of structuring or
coping with accountability and to praise those who lay down clear rules and take decisive stands; (c) to prefer
simple philosophies of corporate governance (the shareholder over stakeholder model) and to endorse
organizational norms such as hierarchical filtering that reduce cognitive overload on top management by
short-circuiting unnecessary argumentation. Intuitive theories of good judgment apparently cut across levels
of analysis and are deeply grounded in personal epistemologies and political ideologies.
Disciplines
Business Intelligence | Cognition and Perception | Cognitive Psychology | Experimental Analysis of Behavior
| Management Information Systems | Management Sciences and Quantitative Methods
This technical report is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/mgmt_papers/337
 1 
Cognitive Biases and Organizational Correctives: 
Do Both Disease and Cure Depend on the Political Beholder? 
 
 
Philip E. Tetlock 
The Ohio State University 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 I appreciate the support of National Science Foundation grant #SBR 9505680 and the 
Institute of Personality and Social Research at the University of California, Berkeley and the 
Mershon Center of The Ohio State University.  I also thank the research participants and their 
employers for giving some of their valuable time in completing a series of, admittedly a tad 
tedious, questionnaires.  Finally, I thank Sara Bassett, Rachel Szteiter, Charles McGuire, Dan 
Newman, Greg Mitchell, Orie Kristel, and Beth Elson for research assistance.  Correspondence 
should be sent to Philip E. Tetlock, Department of Psychology, 142 Townshend Hall, 1885 Neil 
Avenue, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, 43210. 
 2 
 
Cognitive Biases and Organizational Correctives: 
Do Both Disease and Cure Depend on the Political Beholder? 
 
 
 3 
Abstract 
  Managers evaluated scenarios that depicted decision-making processes at micro, meso, 
and macro levels of analysis: putative cognitive biases of individuals, strategies of structuring 
and coping with accountability relationships between supervisors and employees, and strategies 
that corporate entities use to cope with accountability demands from the broader society. 
Political ideology and cognitive style emerged as especially consistent predictors of the value 
spins that managers placed on stories at all three levels of analysis.  Specifically, conservative 
managers with strong preferences for cognitive closure were most likely: (a) to defend simple 
heuristic-driven “errors” such as over-attribution and over-confidence and to warn of the 
mirror-image mistakes of  failing to hold people accountable and of diluting sound policies with 
“irrelevant” side-objectives; (b) to be skeptical of complex strategies of structuring or coping 
with accountability and to praise those who lay down clear rules and take decisive stands; (c) to 
prefer simple philosophies of corporate governance (the shareholder over stakeholder model) and 
to endorse organizational norms such as hierarchical filtering that reduce cognitive overload on 
top management by short-circuiting “unnecessary” argumentation.  Intuitive theories of good 
judgment apparently cut across levels of analysis and are deeply grounded in personal 
epistemologies and political ideologies. 
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 Experimental research on judgement and choice has now reached voluminous proportions 
and it paints a decidedly unflattering portrait of the individual decision maker (Dawes, 1998; 
Goldstein & Hogarth, 1996; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). Experimental subjects, it has 
been repeatedly claimed, fall prey to a wide assortment of errors and biases. They are often too 
quick to jump to conclusions about the personalities of other people (even when there are highly 
plausible situational explanations for the conduct in question), too slow to change their minds in 
response to disconfirming feedback, excessively confident in their predictions, and prone to give 
too much weight to irrelevant cues (such as sunk costs) and too little weight to relevant ones 
(such as opportunity costs). Although this grim portrait has been qualified by the recent 
emergence of dual-process models of judgement and choice which bestow on people some 
limited capacity to decide how to decide (see Simon, 1955, for a classic statement of this position 
and see Chaiken and Trope, 1999 for a compendious collection of current motivated-tactician or 
cognitive-manager models), it still remains the case that the dominant emphasis in the last 
quarter century of experimental work has been on the judgmental shortcomings of human beings. 
 How should organizational theorists react to this burgeoning body of evidence of 
deviations from rationality at the individual level of analysis? March (1989,1995) has 
constructed a useful  inventory of key conceptual stumbling blocks likely to trip up confident 
reductionists who think it is easy to extrapolate across levels of analysis: 
(1) Utilitarian versus Rule-Based Models of Choice.  Laboratory researchers stress the reality- 
appraisal and utility-maximizing functions of judgment and choice. People are posited to be 
intuitive scientists, statisticians, or psychologists engaged in a continuous struggle to achieve 
cognitive mastery of their world (Fiske and Taylor, 1991). People pursue this epistemic goal for 
a mixture of intrinsic reasons such as curiosity and extrinsic reasons such as the quest for 
predictive leverage in anticipating events--leverage which, in turn, confers competitive 
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advantage on people in their capacity as intuitive economists who are ever on the prowl for more 
effective ways of  advancing their material interests. One’s selection of functionalist metaphor 
should not be dismissed as a mere matter of explanatory aesthetics; it is profoundly 
consequential (Lakatos, 1970).  What counts as an error or bias in judgment or choice is shaped 
by the metaphor-laden standards of rationality that we use to evaluate how people think. 
Consider three examples:   
(a) the alleged fundamental attribution error--the tendency of observers to conclude too quickly 
that conduct of others is under the control of stable personality traits when explanations that 
invoke the immediate situation are just as plausible. This “error” counts as an error only when  
we posit that people make causal attributions for conduct with the epistemic objectives of 
intuitive scientists/psychologists and, to this end,  employ logical-inference algorithms such as 
correspondent inference and the discounting, augmentation and covariation principles; 
(b) the tendency to slight statistical generalizations and to give excessive weight to case-specific 
information in making predictions. Failure to use predictively useful base rates becomes an error 
only within a framework that posits people to be intuitive statisticians who are using Bayesian or 
regression principles to minimize classification errors;  
(c) the frequent observation that people are too slow to acknowledge certain trade-offs or to write 
off certain types of sunk costs. Failure to confront certain trade-offs or to abandon apparently 
failing policies can be unequivocally classified as an error only within an intuitive-economist 
framework that insists that, in the search for utility-maximizing options, no principle is sacred or 
above calculation. 
 March and Olson (1989, 1995) urge us to step back and contemplate the important 
possibility that these dominant functionalist metaphors do not map in any neat one-to-one 
fashion onto managerial decision-makers’ conceptions of how they do or should make judgments 
and choices. As we move from the laboratory to actual organizations, decision makers may, 
among other things, shift from quantitative utility-based logics to more qualitative, rule-based 
logics of appropriateness that call on them to fulfill identities or roles by acting in accord with 
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their normative definitions of the situation.  The refusal to factor base rates into one’s 
calculations of likelihood of category membership, especially when those base rates correlate 
with ethnicity or race in late 20th century America,  may reflect not our failings as intuitive 
statisticians but rather a principled defense of egalitarian political values (Koehler, 1996; 
Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000). Resistance to contemplating so-called taboo 
trade-offs--for instance, those that require affixing monetary values to human life or loyalty or 
integrity--may stem not from cognitive laziness or lack of capacity to engage in the necessary 
mental operations, but rather from a moralistic defense of sacred values against secular 
encroachments (people as “intuitive theologians” -- Tetlock, Peterson, and Lerner, 1996; Fiske 
and Tetlock, 1997). The tendency to prefer dispositional explanations for conduct, perhaps 
especially undesirable conduct, may derive not from our deficiencies as intuitive psychologists, 
but rather from a principled or calculated decision by many people (in the functionalist role of 
intuitive prosecutors) that one of the best ways to pressure other people to live up to performance 
expectations is to convey that one has a low perceptual threshold for drawing inferences about 
character from conduct.  The implicit message is: “don’t bother concocting ingenious situational 
justifications or excuses for conduct that falls short of prevailing norms.  I believe that what you 
do virtually always reveals a lot about what kind of person you are and about how committed 
you are to this organization”. 
(2) Is the goal to achieve clarity and consistency or is it instead to generate ambiguity, confusion 
and ever greater latitude for organized hypocrisy (saying one thing and doing another)? Intuitive 
scientists seek clarity of understanding and intuitive economists treat consistency as a minimal 
defining feature of rationality. In many organizational contexts, however, people may function 
more like intuitive politicians whose guiding goal is to maintain good working relations with the 
diverse constituencies to whom they feel, for whatever reason, accountable. Confronted by 
ambiguous or by conflicting accountability demands, Tetlock et al. (1996) document that it is 
often be adaptive for both individual and collective actors to find ways of fudging trade-offs 
(e.g., university administrators in late 20th century America who announce that “excellence is 
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diversity”), of obfuscating where they stand on contested issues (e.g., administrators who take 
cover under moralistic platitudes and vague legalisms such as “we believe in fairness” or “we are 
an equal opportunity employer”), and of convincing others that  responsibility for certain 
decisions belongs elsewhere within the institution or in another institution  altogether (e.g., 
administrators who offer accounts of the form “we understand your grievance but that policy is 
under review by another agency”). Confronted by unfamiliar or complex choice problems, it may 
often be sensible for decision makers to focus on the most readily justifiable choice options, even 
if that means violating basic consistency axioms of rational-choice theory such as ignoring 
irrelevant alternatives or violating the sure-thing principle (Simonson, 1991; Tetlock, 1992a). 
(3) Should decision making be viewed as a purely instrumental process or should the focus be on 
the symbolic meaning that the process  takes on as an end in itself to constituencies both inside 
and outside the organization? The intuitive-scientist metaphor depicts thought as a means to the 
end of understanding and solving problems and the intuitive-economist metaphor depicts thought 
as a means toward the goal of utility maximization in competitive markets. A sound decision 
process yields good--ideally, the best possible--outcomes according to either an epistemic or 
utilitarian standard of evaluation. Alternative functionalist metaphors--especially the intuitive 
politician, jurist, and theologian--alert us to the possibility that how decisions are made can be an 
important end in itself. For example, some observers defend  multiple-advocacy, 
high-participation, styles of decision making over more elitist, top-down styles not only on the 
consequentialist ground that multiple advocacy leads to better soutcomes (Janis & Mann, 1977; 
George, 1980) but also on the deontic ground that there is a moral imperative is to give the full 
range of affected groups a “voice” in the process (Hirschman, 1970). Moreover, this moral 
argument for taking process seriously can also be given an added consequentialist edge.  People 
who feel that  they have not been treated unfairly and disrespectfully may become disaffected 
and more likely to protest, cheat, and resign (Rusbult et al,. 1988; Tyler, 1990).  Indeed, large 
swathes of organizations may exist less for their instrumental rationality and more for their 
symbolic efficacy in convincing key internal and external constituencies that the organization is 
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indeed committed to sacrosanct societal values such equal opportunity, environmental protection, 
or balancing work and family (Meyer, 1983).  
 Taken in its entirety, this Marchian inventory reminds us that the normative standards 
that laboratory researchers find most useful in defining “good judgment” may be of limited use, 
and may sometimes be downright misleading, once we embed the processes of judgment and 
choice in  organizational  settings characterized by sharp contests for power and influence, 
intense demands for accountability from conflicting constituencies, prickly principal-agent 
relationships, and enormous uncertainty about what should be done next.  We should not be 
astonished, therefore, when work-a-day managers occasionally have the temerity to second-guess 
the normative judgment calls of high-profile experimental researchers. We should also not be 
astonished if we often discover systematic rifts in the opinions that managers themselves hold 
about what is and is not rational and about the types of organizational and political reforms that 
are likely either to attenuate or amplify particular deviations from rationality. 
 Theorists who work within uni-functionalist frameworks will be inclined to treat such 
disagreements over ‘cognitive biases” and “organizational correctives” as presumptive evidence  
that one camp must be right and the other wrong.  “Right” and “wrong” take on clear-cut 
meanings within the intuitive-scientist framework, preoccupied as it is with maximizing 
epistemic goals, or within the intuitive-economist framework, preoccupied as it is with 
maximizing utilitarian goals in competitive markets that ruthlessly punish suboptimal practices.  
These theorists argue that when the task is well-defined, there are rigorous mathematical 
baselines -- derived from Bayes’ theorem and statistical decision theory -- for gauging exactly 
how mistaken people are. 
 By contrast, “right” and “wrong” quickly become tendentious categorizations within a 
multi-functional theory of judgment and choice that incorporates less-well-defined task 
constraints and goals such as projecting desired social identities to key constituencies , 
proclaiming fealty to sacred values, and defending the normative order.  From a multi-functional 
perspective, disagreements over cognitive biases and organizational correctives count as 
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presumptive evidence that the disputants subscribe to distinctive ideological worldviews that rest 
on diverging assumptions about human nature and the social order, about how to understand 
social reality and navigate self through it, and about the goals that give purpose to one’s life and 
that define one’s relationship to various social structures.  Confronted by disagreements over 
“what is rational” and over “how to fix alleged departures from rationality,” the appropriate 
research response is to trace these disagreements to their ultimately philosophical and ideological 
roots. 
 The current article proceeds from the premise that managers’ opinions about cognitive 
bias and organizational correctives are rooted in competing epistemological and ideological 
world views (although, not surprisingly, most managers take pride in thinking of themselves as 
pragmatic problem-solvers and resist characterizations of their views as either philosophical or 
ideological). Following extensively validated research procedures in the literature on cognitive 
styles -- especially Kruglanski and Webster (1996) and Tetlock (1998) -- we assess personal 
epistemologies along a cognitive-style continuum dubbed preference for simplicity and 
explanatory closure.  At one end of the continuum, we observe distaste for ambiguity and 
protracted debate and strong endorsements of the views that the social world is fundamentally 
simple and the most effective strategies of coping with it are also simple.  At the other end, we 
observe a high-comfort level for dissonance and uncertainty and strong endorsements of the 
views that the social world is enormously complex and pluralistic and that the most effective 
strategies of coping with it are comparably complex and pluralistic (multifaceted 
perspective-taking and trade-offs).  Following research precedents in the literature on political 
ideology in mass and elite samples (Lipsett & Raub, 1978; McClosky & Brill, 1983; Rokeach, 
1973; Tetlock, 1984), we assess ideological world views with a battery of items that tap views of 
human nature (how trustworthy, rational and resilient are people?) as well as endorsements of 
individualistic values (skeptical of encroachments on economic liberty), 
egalitarian/environmentalist values (skeptical of workings of unregulated markets, sensitive to 
needs to check negative externalities, to generate public goods, and to rectify wrongs of past), 
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and traditional conservative values (strong religious faith, positive attitude toward authority and 
strict enforcement of rules).  Consistent with past research on public attitudes, especially work 
on “elites” (Kinder, 1998), it was impossible to create a psychometrically defensible 
one-dimensional measure of ideology but we did converge on a two-factor solution that included 
a traditional-conservatism/anti-authoritarian/egalitarianism factor (anchored at one end by an 
unapologetic defense of social hierarchies and suspicions about both the trustworthiness and 
competence of the modal employee and anchored at the other end by a distaste for hierarchy and 
a markedly more benign view of humanity) and a market-libertarianism/anti-libertarian 
egalitarianism factor (anchored at one end by enthusiastic embrace of market solutions to social 
problems, deep skepticism of government, and a view of humanity as resourceful, rational, and 
self-reliant and anchored at the other end by a deep skepticism of market solutions and a view of 
humanity as fragile and in need of protection by a caring state). 
 Our guiding hypothesis was that cognitive style and ideological worldview would jointly 
predict managerial reactions to a broad assortment of scenarios pitched at micro, meso, and 
macro levels of analysis.  Predictions focused on:   
(a) the soundness of patterns of thinking of individual decision makers;  
(b) the soundness of different strategies of structuring accountability relationships, and of coping 
with accountability relationships, between immediate supervisors and those reporting to them;  
(c) the soundness of competing political schemes for organizing accountability systems at the 
corporate or societal level--schemes that are often proposed either  to improve the quality of 
collective decision making or to advance the cause of social justice. 
Micro:  Predicting Reactions to the Fundamental Attribution Error, Over-Confidence, Forbidden 
Base Rates, and Taboo Trade-Offs.   
One key predictor of what counts as a cognitive bias in social perception was hypothesized to be 
one’s baseline assumptions about the trustworthiness of other people.  How prone are others to 
take advantage of the inevitable incompleteness of even the most formal contracts (not to 
mention informal understandings based on the proverbial handshake)? How wise is it to pressure 
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others to live up to their ends of social bargains by setting a low threshold for drawing inferences 
about character even when plausible situational explanations exist?  Ceteris paribus, the more 
Hobbesian or pessimistic one’s view of human nature, the more egoistic, calculating and 
self-serving others one should suppose others to be, and the more justifiable the fundamental 
attribution error will appear to be--perhaps especially when explaining deviant or disappointing 
conduct. Drawing on past surveys of public opinion (McClosky and Brill, 1983; Sniderman, 
1975), traditional conservatives were hypothesized to subscribe to a more jaundiced view of 
humanity than were those on the ideological left and thus more likely to rise to the normative 
defense of the fundamental attribution error by insisting both that the putative error is not all that 
erroneous (people are often untrustworthy) and that it is often prudent (it is better, on average, to 
indict the occasional innocent soul than it is to fail to punish the sinful masses of defectors); 
 A second hypothesized predictor of what constitutes bias is managers’ opinions of the 
rationality and resilience of fellow human beings.  The more doubts one harbors about the 
intellectual maturity of one’s fellow human beings, about their tolerance for ambiguity and 
dissonance,  the more prone one will be to adopt a more authoritarian model of the ideal leader 
that springs right out of Machiavelli’s advice to Renaissance princes. Leaders are well advised to 
project a strong persona to subordinates: to display confidence in their views (even if, on 
average, this means that they are systematically over-confident), to conceal past mistakes 
whenever possible (even if this occasionally requires continuing commitments to 
red-ink-hemorrhaging projects)  and to offer the masses simplistic assessments of the challenges 
confronting the collective (even if this requires denying divisive trade-offs lurking on the 
forecasting horizon). Drawing again on survey work in public opinion ( McClosky & Brill, 
1983), as well as on the cognitive style literature (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996), it was expected 
that ideological conservatives, especially those with strong preferences for closure, would most 
deeply doubt the cognitive and political maturity of subordinates and would accordingly  rise to 
the strongest normative defense of managers who are over-confident, of managers who stay the 
course with projects that have run into “temporary trouble,” and of managers who cloak  painful 
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trade-offs under artful rhetoric.  
 At this juncture, however, skeptics might suspect that the apparent normative divergence 
between the laboratory classifications of effects as errors and biases and managers’ assessments 
merely rests on a misunderstanding over levels of analysis.  Respondents may still see 
over-confidence, escalating commitment to sunk costs and trade-off denial as private cognitive 
vices; they just also see them as public or political necessities. The disagreement revolves around 
what leaders need to do to sustain useful social illusions. To test whether conservative 
respondents with strong preferences for closure truly subscribe to a different theory of good 
judgment (as opposed to a different theory of rhetorical manipulation), we need to gauge their 
reactions to private decision making procedures as well as to public posturing. Here again 
though, there are reasons for predicting systematic divergence. Drawing on survey research 
(Sniderman, 1975), archival content-analysis studies of political decision making (Tetlock, 
1984), and laboratory studies of cognitive style (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996), there are reasons 
for suspecting that conservatives with strong preferences for rapid closure are often sincere in 
their defenses of over-confidence, of setting  high thresholds for changing their minds, and of 
setting  high thresholds for qualifying the pursuit of a core objective with ancillary objectives 
that create ‘unnecessary’ or ‘distracting’ trade-offs. 
 A third dimension along which managers probably vary is their assumptions about the 
goals of judgment and choice. Some may subscribe to a monistic conception in which nothing 
should interfere with efficiency and profit maximization (Jensen and Meckling, 1976); others 
subscribe to a more pluralistic conceptions that frequently place moral and political constraints 
on the pursuit of efficiency (Etzioni, 1996).  For instance, those on the political left should be 
more likely than conservatives or libertarians to object to factoring into policy deliberations 
statistical base rates that, however probative, work to the disadvantage of traditionally 
disadvantaged groups (e.g., setting insurance premiums for neighborhoods in which actuarial risk 
and racial/ethnic composition tightly covary). Those on the libertarian right should take least 
umbrage at taboo trade-offs (that affix dollar values to human life). Those on the traditional 
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conservative right should be the least curious about the “true causes” of their subordinates’ 
conduct and most concerned with pressuring employees to behave themselves (the intuitive 
psychologist trumped by the intuitive prosecutor). 
Meso:  Predicting Preferred Strategies of Structuring, and Coping With, Accountability.  
Opinions about what constitutes a cognitive bias (or, indeed, moral deficiency) at the individual 
level should be closely coupled to opinions about how to design accountability systems that 
prevent these individual shortcomings from impeding (or tainting) organizational functions.  
One hypothesis was that conservatives with strong preferences for cognitive closure would 
approve of bosses who give their subordinates well-defined job missions and accountability 
guidelines whereas those on the left-liberal end of the continuum should see good rationales for 
creating normative ambiguity and encouraging imaginative exercises that undercut authority and 
tradition. A second hypothesis was that these ideological and cognitive-stylistic preferences 
would steep into evaluations of employees responding to accountability pressures from 
higher-ups.  Conservatives and those with strong closure preferences should be more favorable 
to employees whose reports offer clear and unequivocal recommendations (echoing Harry 
Truman’s preference for one-armed economic advisors) whereas egalitarians and those with little 
need to reach rapid closure should favor employees whose reports acknowledge uncertainty and 
enumerate complex trade-offs (“on the one hand .. and on the other ...”). 
 A third hypothesis was that egalitarians should favor process over outcome accountability 
but that traditional conservatives and radical individualists should hold the opposite preference. 
Those on the liberal left are more likely to fear the unfairness of holding people accountable for 
outcomes that are only partly under their control (and hence are more willing to forgive those 
who fail but who followed the right procedures). Those on the libertarian right are more likely to 
fear the perverse bureaucratic incentives by shifting from a problem-solving focus on 
maximizing external outcomes to a ritualistic focus on observing prescribed routines (cf. Chubb 
and Moe, 1990, on the accountability norms of private and public schools). Libertarians tend to 
identify process accountability with the most notorious inefficiencies of public sector 
 14 
organizations (J.Q. Wilson, 1980).  Traditional conservatives share this concern but they also 
worry about making performance appraisal unnecessarily cumbersome and opening the door to 
endless justifications and excuses for non-performance. 
 A final set of hypotheses predicts ideological variation in managerial reactions to 
accountability dilemmas that implicate classic problems of distributive and procedural justice. A 
recurring theme in the literature on distributive justice is the tension between the value of 
efficiency (which requires directing resources to those who will use them most productively) and 
equality (which requires subsidizing the less productive). The guiding hypothesis was that 
ideological cleavages in the broader society would manifest themselves in managerial 
philosophy:  egalitarians would resist making managerial decisions that concentrated budget 
cuts on the least productive whereas traditional conservatives and market libertarians would have 
no reservations about doing so. With respect to procedural justice, there is the classic tension 
between the desire of authorities to enforce rules and the countervailing concern that everyone 
should feel that they had a fair say. The guiding hypothesis was that egalitarians should be more 
sympathetic to employees who resisted decisions from above that ignored their point of view, 
sympathy that would extend not just to employees exercising the voice option (protest)  and, if 
need be,  the exit (resignation) option but perhaps even to employees engaging in conduct of 
dubious morality (loophole exploitation). By contrast, traditional conservatives should be more 
sympathetic to employees who defer to commands from above (conservatives are not 
embarrassed about talking about “subordinates”) and more inclined to regard protestors as 
whiners and malcontents, quitters as disloyal, and loophole exploiters as cheaters. Libertarians 
will also be inclined to back upper management but less out of affinity for hierarchy and more 
out of deference to formal contracts and property rights. Their reactions to loophole exploiters 
will also be harsh but their reactions to protestors will be muted (less upset as libertarians are by 
“insubordination”) and their reactions to those who exit may even be positive (resourceful, 
self-reliant people don’t passively accept ill-treatment, they find a better deal in the labor 
market). 
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(e) Macro:  Predicting Attitudes toward Corporate Governance.  How should accountability 
relationships within the organization as a whole, and between the organization and the broader 
society be structured? Once again, the traditional conservative preference for simple and 
unambiguous lines of authority and standards of accountability has numerous institutional 
opportunities to manifest itself.  One hypothesis was that, and those with strong preferences for 
rapid closure should be skeptical of multiple-advocacy systems that require soliciting and 
integrating inputs from a wide range of perspectives prior to reaching decisions and they should 
be more enthusiastic about hierarchical, top-down, decision systems that place a lot of authority 
in a few hands and that permit--when necessary-- rapid implementation of new initiatives. Here 
it is worth stressing that this split between left and right may be rooted in two distinct sources: 
those on the right should be both more dubious of the added utility of soliciting diverse inputs as 
a means to the end of better decisions (subordinates may actually detract from the quality of 
debate) and they should be less committed to the egalitarian goal of giving voice, and the 
attendant sense that one has been heard, to the hoi polloi as a moral end in itself.   
 A second hypothesis was that those who most value hierarchy and parsimony would 
display stronger support for the shareholder model of corporate governance (a stringently 
monistic accountability regime that calls on management (technically, the agents) to work 
single-mindedly toward the goal of greater financial returns to shareholders (technically, the 
principals)) and greater skepticism toward the stakeholder model (a more open-ended pluralistic 
accountability regime that calls on management to balance the contradictory demands of a 
cacophonous host of clamorous constituencies). To be sure, this preference for the shareholder 
model need not be rooted entirely in cognitive-stylistic affinity for accountability systems in 
which it is relatively straightforward to determine whether management is doing a good job. 
Traditional conservatives and modern libertarians should be especially sympathetic to the 
interests of the capitalized principals (who possess the moral trump card of rightful ownership 
and whose interests should be advanced as an end in itself) as well as to a single-minded focus 
on efficiency (Jensen & Meckling, 1976 ). Critical though they indisputably are to the long-term 
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profitability of the enterprise, stakeholders “have not put their money where their mouths are” 
and occupy a distinctly secondary place in both the moral and pragmatic schemes of things. By 
contrast,  liberals and social democrats should be more inclined to endorse: (a) the functional 
view that, given the pluralistic and interdependent character of modern  business environments, 
it  does not make practical sense to exclude key voices from the policy setting process; (b) the 
moral view that the “economic underdogs” and traditionally disadvantaged also deserve to be 
heard and won’t be unless granted places on Boards of Directors (Etzioni, 1996). 
Summary of Hypotheses.  This study examines the patterns of consistency in managerial 
judgments of the soundness of decision-making practices and accountability procedures at micro, 
meso, and macro levels of analysis.  the study focuses on two major potential predictors of these 
patterns,  ideological worldview and the cognitive-style construct of preference for simplicity 
and explanatory closure, but also assesses a host of potential control variables, including 
private-public sector employment, gender, income, age, and education.  It is also worth stressing 
that, although the current study is largely an exercise in hypothetico-deductive social science, 
there is  an exploratory inductive dimension to the research design.  A set of in-depth 
interviews with specially selected ideological subsets of managers probed their justifications for 
their judgments of what constitutes good judgment at each of the three levels of analysis.   
Method 
      Questionnaires were distributed to approximately 650 middle-managers in 3 public sector 
organizations (employing, on average, 5000 persons)  and 3 private-sector organizations 
(employing, on average, 4500 persons).  Of the managers in our target population, 39% 
ultimately responded to all or most of the questionnaire, yielding a sample of 259 managers who 
averaged 42.3 years of age, had 5.1 years of higher education, and had 8.2 years of experience in 
coordinating and supervising staffs that ranged in size from 4 to 210. The sex-ratio was 7 males 
to every three females.  Data collection occurred in 1996 and 1997.  The private-sector 
organizations included an insurance company and two high-technology firms; the public-sector 
organizations were civilian agencies of the federal government that specialized in national 
 17 
security or intelligence analysis and a state-level educational bureaucracy. Both individual 
respondents and organizational representatives  were assured of the absolute confidentiality of 
all responses. The questionnaires was ananlytically partitioned into three components: 
ideological worldview, cognitive style, and preferred managerial styles (which measured 
reactions to micro, meso, and macro scenarios and problems).   
Ideological worldview. These items — each involving a 7-point semantic-differential-style scale 
-- assessed ideological self-identification (using a question adapted from the 
National-Election-Studies: “overall, do you consider yourself to be a liberal or conservative?”) as 
well as views of the trustworthiness of other people (“most people are looking for ways of 
getting away with something” and “when you treat employees with fairness and consideration, 
you can count on them to do the right thing even when no one is looking”), the resourcefulness 
and rationality of others (“people lower down in organizations generally understand a lot more 
than they are given credit for,” “even the strongest among us fall on hard times and need help 
from the community,” “a useful maxim in dealing with employees is KISS -- “keep it simple, 
stupid”), the willingness to defend explicit hierarchies (“I am not at all embarrassed to talk about 
“subordinates” or “people working under me in the chain of command,” “It is not a perfect 
relationship but generally the higher in an organization you look, the more talented and 
hardworking the people tend to be”, “It sounds old fashioned but obedience is an important 
virtue”), the willingness to defend the single-minded pursuit of profit-maximization (“it is a bad 
idea to mix business goals with concerns for social justice,” “human progress owes a lot to 
innovators who had the courage of their convictions”),  the relative importance of “avoiding 
being taken advantage of” versus “failing to reach mutually beneficial relationships with others,” 
the necessity of strong leadership (“most people are without direction in the absence of  strong 
leadership”), enthusiasm for free markets (they “stimulate growth and prosperity”), wariness of 
markets (“we need government to protect us from the income inequality and damage to the 
natural environment that result from unregulated free markets”) and attitudes toward government 
(“overall, in our society today, government creates a lot more problems than it solves”). 
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Cognitive style. These items were mostly adapted from Kruglanski and Webster’s (1996) 
need-for-closure scale.  These items assessed tolerance for ambiguity (“I dislike questions that 
can be answered in many different ways”; “It is annoying to listen to someone who cannot seem 
to make up his or her mind”), and strength of personal preference for simple comprehensive 
explanations of phenomena, for working on problems with clear-cut solutions, and for working 
in homogeneous as opposed to heterogeneous social units (“The world is fundamentally a far 
simpler place than it initially seems to be”; “Even after I have made up my mind about 
something, I am always eager to consider a different opinion”; “I usually make important 
decisions quickly and confidently”; “When considering most conflict situations, I can usually see 
how both sides can be right”; “I prefer interacting with people whose opinions are very different 
from my own”; “it is better to accomplish one objective really well than it is to try to accomplish 
two or more objectives and do only a so-so job”). 
Preferred managerial style at the micro, meso, and macro levels of analysis. Order of 
presentation of managerial problems and dilemmas was always counterbalanced within all 
repeated-measure scenarios.  
Micro Scenarios: Assessing reactions to putative cognitive biases.  
(1) Fundamental Attribution Error.  This pair of scenarios assessed approval of managers who 
varied in their receptiveness to employees’ accounts for failure to achieve organizational goals. 
Half of the respondents were randomly assigned to the experimental condition in which they first 
read a scenario describing a prime managerial candidate for the fundamental attribution error--a 
manager with a low threshold for drawing strong conclusions about the character of his 
employees from performance data alone: 
(a)   “J.M. adopts a “no-excuses” approach to evaluating the people who report to him.  He 
feels that most people are just far too inventive at concocting stories for failing to achieve 
organizational goals.  He therefore holds people strictly accountable for objective performance 
indicators, taking into account only relatively extreme extenuating circumstances.” 
 After rating the manager, these respondents then read a scenario that described an 
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empathic manager who seemed a prime candidate for the flipside inferential bias, 
hyper-receptivity to any and all situational explanations that people might advance for their 
conduct: 
“L.V. thinks it a bad idea to base evaluations of the people reporting to him on so-called 
objective performance indicators.  He needs to hear the employees’ perspectives on why they 
failed or succeeded in achieving key organizational goals and always bases his evaluation 
primarily on the accounts that employees provide of what is actually going on in both the 
business and their personal lives.” 
 The other half of the respondents read the scenarios in the opposite order.  Key 
dependent variables included 8 descriptive phrases to which managers responded on  1-9 
unipolar scales ranging from “not at all characteristic” to “extremely characteristic”. The traits 
were selected to capture the negative and positive value spins that could plausibly be attached to 
both managerial stances toward employees.  The most negative value spin on the fundamental 
attribution error is that it reveals a “harsh,” and “punitive” style of management; the most 
positive value spin on the “error”  is that it reveals “uncompromisingly high standards,” and “a 
commitment to a no-nonsense, no-excuses working style.”  The most negative value spin on the 
flipside of the fundamental attribution error — hypersensitivity to situational accounts —  is that 
such managers are “gullible” and “tolerant of low or inconsistent standards.”  The alpha for the 
four scales is 0.81 the most positive value spin is that such managers are 
“compassionate”/“empathic,”  and “psychologically perceptive.”  The alpha for these four 
scales was 0.84. 
 An additional single-item measure of attitude toward the fundamental attribution “error” 
was:  “Managers always run the risk in evaluating employees of two possible mistakes:  (a) 
failing to hold them responsible for outcomes that they could and should have controlled; (b) 
holding them responsible for outcomes that they could not reasonably be expected to control.”  
Participants then rated (on a 1-9 scale), the relative frequency and seriousness of these two errors 
in work settings today (with “9" representing the view that (b) is “by far the more common 
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serious error”). 
(2) Over-confidence.  A second pair of counterbalanced scenarios explored evaluations of 
managers who viewed either over- or under-confidence as the more serious vice: 
 “It is always possible to make one of two basic mistakes in decision-making:  to be 
underconfident (to doubt that one has useful information in hand when one really does) or to be 
overconfident (to think one has useful information in hand when one really does not).  But 
L.B./N.R. is convinced that underconfidence/overconfidence is much the more serious threat to 
high-quality decision-making and that [priority should be given to encouraging critical analysis 
of core assumptions, even if that slows decision making down] [priority should be given to 
advancing compelling arguments and mobilizing enthusiasm for what looks like the best option, 
even if it means acting too quickly]. 
  Key dependent variables captured positive value spins on over-confidence (decisive, 
possesses a can-do attitude) as well as negative value spins (rigid/closed-minded, arrogant) 
(alpha = 0.76) and positive value spins on under-confidence (flexible/open-minded, possesses 
capacity for self-criticism) as well as negative value spins (indecisive, wishy-washy) (alpha = 
0.78). 
 In addition, a single-item measure of attitude toward over/underconfidence explicitly 
distinguished between private thought and public self-presentation.  Respondents rated their 
degree of preference (on a 9-point scale) for  two styles of leadership: 
“M.V. believes that, however many doubts about a decision he may harbor privately, he needs to 
project confidence that he has the right answer to employees” vs. “A.V. believes that if he has 
private doubts about a decision, it is a good idea to share those concerns with employees.” 
(3) Staying the Course versus Abandoning Sunk Costs.  Participants rated on a 9-point scale the 
relative frequency of one of two mistakes that managers nowadays can make: they “are more 
likely to make the mistake of prematurely abandoning a good idea that runs into trouble” or “to 
make the flipside mistake of persevering too long with a bad idea and spending good money after 
bad”). 
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(4) Simple Heuristics versus Complex Choice Strategies.. Answering again on  a 9-point scale: 
“Which mistake do you think managers nowadays are more likely to make: to rely too heavily on 
simple, intuitive rules of thumb grounded in practical experience or to exaggerate the complexity 
of the issues at stake and to spend far too much time and energy seeking expert advice and 
developing complex decision-making procedures?” 
(5) Morally Suspect Trade-Offs. This single-item measure explored reactions to a cost-benefit 
analysis that placed a dollar value on human life:  “S.J. is an auto-industry executive who 
received a confidential cost-benefit analysis which indicated that the expected cost of recalling a 
popular car and correcting a potential safety defect  is $900 million whereas the expected 
benefits (reduced legal liability from the expected 50 serious injuries and deaths) is just $300 
million, a 3:1 ratio in favor of taking no action.” How do you think he should respond: “go along 
with the recommendation and do not undertake the repairs” (1) and “ reject the report’s 
recommendation and order the potential safety defect corrected” (9). 
(6) Morally Suspect Base Rates. This single-item measure explored opposition to 
profit-maximization rooted in egalitarian/fairness concerns:  “G.B. is an executive who 
discovered that, although the actuarial risk factors used to compute home owners’ insurance 
premiums are statistically and financially well designed to maximize profits and are not open to 
legal challenge, the net result of using these risk factors is that poor people, who come 
disproportionately from minority groups, wind up paying higher percentage premiums.” How do 
you think he should respond: “keep the current profit-maximizing policies in place” (scale value 
1) or “alter the current profit-maximizing policy and reduce the burden on the poor communities, 
notwithstanding the adverse effect on the corporate bottom line” (9). 
Meso Scenarios: Assessing reactions to strategies of coping with accountability.  
(1) Pre-emptive Self-Criticism Versus Defensive Bolstering.  This pair of scenarios posed the 
following problem: 
“Senior management has asked K.M. for his views on which projects in his division should be 
put on the “fast track.”  The “favorites” of senior management are at this point impossible to 
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guess.  He responds by [offering a complex and balanced appraisal of the pro’s and con’s of 
each project, anticipating the key criticisms that can be leveled at each, and specifying the 
trade-offs that management confronts] [singling out the projects he considers most promising and 
making as powerful and compelling a case as he can for those options.]” 
 Key dependent variables included the same trait scales used in assessing reactions to 
over- and under-confidence (an appropriate isomorphism in view of experimental evidence that 
self-critical thought attenuates over-confidence whereas bolstering amplifies 
over-confidence--Tetlock and Kim, 1987). 
(2) Open-ended versus directive accountability. D.F. runs a policy planning group that consists 
of professionals with varying expertise. [He sees it as his job to guide the group by  giving his 
opinion first and by laying out a clear discussion agenda that keeps meetings brief. He finds that 
this procedure helps to set definite boundaries on what it is and is not useful to consider.] [He 
sees it as his job to encourage the group members to think as creatively as possible and, to this 
end, he rarely reveals his opinion before everyone has had a say. Although meetings may be 
long, he believes that the process often reveals important new perspectives.]  
 Bipolar rating scales included positive and negative spins on open-ended accountability 
(open- versus closed-minded) and on directive accountability (well organized/poorly organized). 
(3) Process versus outcome accountability. M.R. runs the purchasing department for his 
organization. [His philosophy is that employees are paid to implement carefully designed 
procedures for making deals with outside providers of goods and services. As long as employees 
follow the specified procedures for selecting high-quality products at competitive bids, 
employees know they won’t get into trouble--even if the resulting price paid is too high.] [His 
philosophy is that employees are paid to get the best possible prices for high-quality products. 
The purchasing procedure guidelines are just that--guidelines, not fixed rules. Employees who 
pay too high a price or who buy defective merchandise jeopardize their careers. Following 
procedures is no defense.] 
 Positive value-spin descriptions of the process-accountability manager included fair and 
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systematic; negative spins included rule-bound and bureaucratic (alpha = 0.75).  Positive value 
spin descriptions of the outcome-accountability manager include resourceful and effective; 
negative value spins excessively demanding and unfair (alpha = 0.83). 
(4) Concentrate Pain Versus Diffuse Sacrifice.  This pair of scenarios went as follows: 
B.G. just learned that the department received a 10% cut in its annual operating budget. He 
responds [by trying to distribute the burden of the cuts fairly and equally across all employees 
who work for him] [by trying to maximize the efficiency of his organization--laying off those 
employees who contribute the least to productivity and streamlining operations by introducing 
new technology that reduces the need for future hiring]. 
 Key dependent variables captured positive and negative value spins that liberals and 
conservatives might place on the egalitarian versus efficiency responses to austerity. The positive 
value spin on concentrating the cuts on the least productive was that this policy “promotes 
profitability and efficiency” and “sends the right message to employees who take their jobs for 
granted”; the negative value spin was that this policy “violates the trust the workers have placed 
in the organization” (the implicit social contract), and “erodes the loyalty toward the organization 
and breeds cynicism and distrust.”  Alpha for the 4-item scale was 0.79.  The positive value 
spin on diffusing the pain is that sharing burdens equally was “morally right in itself” and also 
“promotes solidarity at the workplace” (one for all and all for one); the negative value spin was 
that this policy is merely “a cowardly dodge to avoid controversy” and “is short-sighted and 
likely to destroy the organization in the long term.”  Alpha for this 4-item scale was 0.76. 
(5) Voice, Exit, Subversion, Loyalty.  These scenarios probed reactions to resistance to 
accountability demands that takes the form of protest (exercising the voice option), looking for 
another job (exercising the exit option) and strategic exploitation of loopholes in the 
accountability guidelines: 
 “P.T. learns that the work unit he manages will be expected in the coming year to achieve an 
increase in productivity he considers unreasonably and unfairly large.  His unit was not 
consulted at all during the process of setting the new productivity standard and the firm is doing 
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well and in no danger of insolvency.  P.T. [protests by providing a detailed set of reasons why 
he considers the new standards to be both unreasonable and unfair to his work unit] [resigns to 
take another job] [looks for loopholes in the new accountability guidelines that allow him to 
“play games with numbers” in ways that artificially inflate the perceived productivity of his unit] 
[keeps his objections to himself and does the best he can do to achieve the new performance 
standards].” 
 Key dependent variables captured positive and negative value spins on voice (alpha = 
0.75) exit (alpha = 0.82), subversion (alpha = 0.77) and compliance (alpha = 0.80):  protest 
(whiny, ineffective/honest, principled) exit (disloyal, opportunistic/self-reliant, autonomous), 
subversion (cheater, fraud/reasonable-response-to-unreasonable demands, resourceful) and 
compliance (easily bullied, submissive/can-do attitude, loyal worker). 
Macro Scenarios:  Assessing reactions to alternative accountability regimes.  
(1) Shareholder Versus Stakeholder.  This pair of scenarios went as follows: 
  “Corporation x is founded on the philosophy that it exists [for one overriding purpose--to 
maximize return to shareholders--and that, if every corporation were faithful to this mission, the 
net long-term result would be a vibrant economy that produces the greatest prosperity for the 
greatest number] [to achieve a variety of sometimes conflicting goals, including providing 
competitive returns to shareholders, ensuring all employees of good livelihoods and respectful 
treatment, maintaining good relations with customers, suppliers, and local communities, and 
pursuing sound social and environmental policies. In this view, if every corporation were faithful 
to theses multiple missions, the net long-term result would be a fundamentally more decent and 
just society.]”   
 Key dependent variables included positive-value-spins on the two models of governance 
(shareholder: “keeps the faith with investors,” “maximizes efficiency and long-term viability of 
the organization”; stakeholder:  “keeps faith with the society as a whole,” “promotes social 
justice”) and negative-value-spins (shareholder:  “short-sighted profit maximizing”, 
“dehumanizes everyone but the investors”; stakeholder:  “creates a blank check for lazy, inept,  
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or corrupt managers”, “prevents managers from making tough decisions critical for long-term 
survival”).  Alpha for the shareholder scale was 0.84 and, for the stakeholder scale, 0.81. 
(2) Multiple Advocacy Versus Hierarchical Filtering.  This pair of scenarios included: 
 “Top management in this organization have worked together a long time and know each other 
well.  [They think it most important to make decisions efficiently, minimizing unnecessary 
discussion and getting to the key points quickly.  Accordingly, they have streamlined the 
decision process, requiring top managers to justify important decisions to the group but rarely 
requiring them to go outside the group to solicit critical suggestions.]  [They think it most 
important to subject important decisions to thorough, critical analysis from a variety of 
viewpoints inside and outside the organization, even if it is time consuming.  Accordingly, top 
managers can never be sure of the types of objections that might be raised to their proposals in 
decision-making meetings.]” 
 Key dependent variables included positive-value-spins of hierarchical filtering (“permits 
decisive action in rapidly changing situations,” “preserves clear lines of authority”) and on 
multiple advocacy (“compels decision-makers to confront unpleasant facts,” “prevents the error 
of acting impulsively”) and negative spins on hierarchical filtering (“encourages an 
over-confident and clique-ish attitude at the top,” “promotes a rigid, authoritarian structure”) and 
of multiple advocacy (“creates a serious risk of waffling and paralysis” “promotes 
anarchy--everyone wants a say on everything”).  Alpha for hierarchial-filtering scales was 0.79 
and, for multiple advocacy, 0.86.   
Exploratory Interviews.  Priority was placed on intensively examining respondents with 
unusually coherent and well-defined ideological world views.  Accordingly, we employed the 
following rules.  Libertarians were identified as individuals with high scores on the 
market-libertarianism factor (strong preference for market-based solutions and distaste for 
government intervention coupled with strong faith in people as rational and resilient) and with 
relatively low scores on the authoritarian-conservatism factor (an aversion to hierarchy).  
Liberal egalitarians were identified as individuals with low scores on the market libertarianism 
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factor and low scores on the authoritarian-conservatism factor.  Traditional conservatives were 
identified as high scorers on the traditional-conservatism factor and as likely to score in the 
middle range of the market-libertarianism factor (their scores on his factor should be inflated by 
their support for market solutions to social problems but should be deflated by their skepticism 
about the rationality of their fellow citizens).  Finally, moderates or centrists were identified as 
scoring in the middle range of both factors. Interviews were eventually conducted with 26 
managers who represented four distinct political points of view:  8 traditional conservatives, 7 
liberal egalitarians, 5 libertarians, and 6 moderates or centrists.  These interviews were designed 
to explore the explanations that managers offered for their reactions to each scenario from the 
structured questionnaire. 
Results 
Independent-variable scales.  Maximum likelihood factor analysis indicated that the 
preference-for-simplicity and-explanatory-closure (PSEC) scale was reasonably unidimensional. 
The scree test indicated that the eigenvalue for the first factor (6.1) was over twice the size of 
that for the second factor (2.3) and the scale as  a whole possessed adequate internal reliability 
(alpha = 0.77).  By contrast, the same factor-analytic procedure indicated that best 
representation of the underlying correlational structure of the measures of ideological worldview 
was two-dimensional.  Table 1 presents the variable loadings that emerged from the two-factor 
oblimin rotated matrix.  The first factor captured more traditional or authoritarian conservatism. 
High-loading items included doubts about the trustworthiness of others, skepticism that even 
employees who have been treated fairly well will reciprocate by “doing the right thing when no 
one else is looking,” placing a greater priority on avoiding exploitation (being taken for a sucker) 
than on failing to achieve mutually beneficial agreements, the belief that obedience is an 
important (and currently under-rated) virtue, the belief that people are rudder-less without strong 
leadership and wariness of government intervention in the economy.  Low scores seemed to 
capture anti-authoritarian egalitarianism: a distaste for obedience and hierarchies,  a relatively 
benign view as people as decent and fair, and a willingness to give those lower down in the 
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pecking order the benefit of the doubt. The second factor  captured a libertarian worldview, 
highlighting items that tapped into faith in the power of free markets, wariness of government, 
and skepticism toward government intervention in the economy, and a view of people as rational, 
resourceful, and self-reliant.  Low scores seemed to capture anti-libertarian egalitarianism: 
support for a safety-net state that redistributes income and carefully watches for negative 
externalities of free-market behavior, doubts about how meritocratic society really is, doubts 
about “Great Man (Person) theories of social progress, and a view of  individual humans as 
fragile and in need of considerable social support.  Interestingly, high scorers on both factors 
tended to label themselves as conservative and Republican and low-scorers tended to label 
themselves as Democrats and liberal (in the conventional late 20th century sense of that term).  
When we created scales by summing the high loading items for each factor (>0.20), the scales 
had reasonable internal consistency (alpha = 0.78).  For convenience, the scale derived from the 
first factor will be called “traditional conservatism” and the scale derived from the second factor 
will be called “market libertarianism.”   
 Although scores on the two factors are moderately positively correlated (r = 0.22), it is a 
mistake to attribute much significance to that relationship, hinging as it does on the proportion of 
items pertaining to skepticism of government and support for markets (inflating the correlation) 
versus the proportion of items tapping views of human nature and support for authority and 
hierarchy (depressing the correlation).  The low positive correlation between traditional 
conservatism and preference for cognitive closure (r = 0.21) is less easily dismissed, replicating 
as it does a long-standing body of work on the links between cognitive style and ideology 
(Lipsett & Raub, 1978; Tetlock, 1984).  It is worth stressing, though, that confirmatory factor 
analysis applied to all individual-difference predictors supports that factorial distinctness of 
traditional conservatism and preference for cognitive closure.. 
Multiple Regressions.  Table 2 summarizes a series of multiple regressions that used the 
two-factor measure of ideological worldview and the measure of cognitive style as predictors of 
what counts as both cognitive bias and organizational corrective.  Control variables included 
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private-public sector employment, seniority, income, education, and gender.  Table 3 presents 
the mean evaluative reactions of respondents who scored in the top and bottom tertiles of the 
measures of ideological worldview and need-for-closure (the most consistent predictors) to each 
of the scenarios and their variants. 
 As the regression coefficients in Table 2, and the means in Table 3 reveal, ideology in its 
two-factor form proved to be a robust predictor of reactions across levels of analysis.  Turning 
first to reactions to putative cognitive biases, traditional conservatives were more favorable to the 
no-excuses manager (who was arguably committing the fundamental attribution “error”  of 
insensitivity to situational explanations) and less favorable to the empathic manager (who was 
arguably committing the flipside error of hypersensitivity to situational justifications and excuses 
that deflect responsibility for non-performance).  There was also an unusually powerful 
association between certain single-item questions  and reactions to the diverging attributional 
styles of managers.  Respondents were especially positive in their evaluations of the 
“no-excuses” manager and skeptical of the effectiveness of the 
“sensitive-to-situational-explanations” manager to the degree:  (a)  they suspected “most people 
are continually looking for what they can get away with”; (b) they placed high importance on 
“preventing others from taking advantage of them”; (c) they felt that managers erred far more 
often in the direction of letting employees off the hook for outcomes they could control than in 
the direction of wrongly blaming employees for outcomes they could control (all r’s > 0.30).  
Indeed, the conservativism factor ceased to predict reactions to these scenarios after controlling 
for these three items (partial r(240) = 0.09).  Suspiciousness of human nature -- which loads 
highly on the traditional conservatism but not on the libertarianism factor -- may thus well be 
driving this effect. 
 Traditional conservatives and market libertarians did, however, have similar reactions to 
the over/underconfidence scenarios:  both reacted favorably toward the manager who felt that 
over-confidence was, all the other things being equal, a less serious error than under-confidence 
in private decision-making and in public self-presentations to employees.  Again, though, more 
 29 
fine-grained analysis revealed unusually powerful associations between certain items and 
reactions to the over- versus under-confident managers.  Partial correlation analysis revealed 
that traditional conservativism  ceased to predict reaction to the scenarios after controlling for 
endorsement of the maxim that, in dealing with employees, it is important to “keep it simple, 
stupid.”  And modern libertarianism ceased to predict reactions after controlling for 
endorsement of the claim that human progress owed a lot to innovators with the courage of their 
convictions.  Thus, although the two camps “on the right” agreed, they do not have the same 
reasons for taking this common stand.  Support could be rooted in fear and distrust or in hope 
and techno-optimism. 
 Traditional conservatives were also the most favorably disposed to managers who taught 
that: (a) abandoning good ideas that had run into temporary trouble was a more common mistake 
than persevering with bad ideas (and vainly trying to save face and recoup sunk costs); (b) 
excessive “complexification” was a more common mistake than excessive simplification in 
decision making.  Market-libertarianism predicted neither sentiment. 
 Traditional conservatives and market libertarians were largely on the same ideological 
wavelength though in offering cautiously non-committal responses to the forbidden base rate and 
taboo trade-off.   Unlike the anti-authoritarians and those on the liberal left, these two groups 
refrained from condemning business practices that, in pursuit of profit, offended egalitarian or 
humanitarian sensitivities. The stance taken in both cases was most clearly rooted, according to 
partial-correlation analysis, in the degree to which respondents thought it a bad idea to mix 
business goals with concerns for social justice.   
 Turning to more cognitive strategies of coping with accountability, traditional 
conservatism, but not libertarianism, positively predicted the attribution of more positive traits to 
decision-makers who coped with accountability demands by taking clear simple stands for which 
they generated mutually reinforcing arguments and from which they could not be easily swayed.  
By contrast, traditional conservatism, but again not libertarianism, was negatively associated 
with the attribution of more positive traits to decision-makers who coped with accountability by 
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engaging in pre-emptively self-critical thinking and by weighing legitimate competing 
perspectives against each other. 
 Traditional conservatives also stood out as the most critical of open-ended accountability 
(in which the boss keeps subordinates guessing where he stands) and most supportive of 
directive accountability in which the boss squarely assumes the mantle of responsibility for 
setting agendas and priorities.  Partial correlational analysis suggested that this effect was partly 
rooted in the belief that people are rudder-less without strong leadership.  Modern libertarians, 
by contrast, stood out as the stoutest defenders of outcome accountability and the most critical of 
precess accountability -- which they disparaged as “just more bureaucracy” and “rules for the 
sake of rules.”  
 Turning to the more overtly political strategies of coping with accountability, traditional 
conservatives and modern libertarians agreed in:  (a) condemning the manager who, in their 
view, avoided the tough decisions by spreading budget cuts equally rather than targeting the cuts 
at the least productive and then restructuring to compensate for shifts in the division of labor; (b) 
applauding the manager who “bit the bullet” and “allocated scarce resources more rationally.”  
The ideological agreement broke down somewhat, however, in reactions to the voice, exit, 
subversion, and loyalty scenarios.  Relative to the low scores on the two factors, traditional 
conservatives and modern libertarians were both more likely to deplore the subversive, 
loophole-exploiting response to rising accountability demands and, to a lesser extent, more likely 
to applaud the loyalty response.  But libertarians had a much more positive reaction to the exit 
response (competent individuals exercising choices in self-correcting labor markets) than did the  
traditional conservatives who saw the same conduct as rather opportunistic.  Traditional 
conservatives also had a more negative reaction to protest than did the libertarians.    
 Finally, sharp ideological cleavages emerged in managerial evaluations of macro 
scenarios that explored the tensions between the shareholder-stakeholder models of  (external) 
corporate governance and the tensions between the hierarchical-filtering and multiple advocacy 
models of (internal) corporate governance.  Traditional conservatives and modern libertarians 
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alike  judged top management more favorably to the degree management favored a monistic 
accountability regime centered around shareholders whereas low scorers on these two 
factor-analytic scales moved in the opposite direction, attributing the most positive traits to top 
managers who endorsed the pluralistic regime of accountability to stakeholders.  Traditional 
conservatives (but not modern libertarians) judged top management more favorably when 
managers relied on hierarchical filtering to simplify the decision process (screening out weak or 
irrelevant arguments) than did those on the left (low scorers on factor 1) who reserved the most 
praise for top managers who embraced a multiple-advocacy style of decision-making that gave 
priority to considering inputs from a wide range of interest groups within the organization. 
 As both Tables 2 and 3 underscore, the cognitive-style results roughly paralleled those for 
traditional conservativism (the two scales correlate 0.21), with high scorers on the scale 
resembling traditional conservatives in their preference for simple decision-making styles across 
levels of analysis but most noticeably at the micro and meso levels.  The expected interactive 
effects of conservatism and cognitive style generally did not, however, emerge.  Private-sector 
employment and gender had significant zero-order correlations with decision-style preferences in 
the predicted directions but, with only a few exceptions, these effects disappeared in the multiple 
regressions.  The exceptions included a tendency for women to prefer an openness to situational 
explanations for performance shortfalls and for public-sector managers to prefer to avoid 
controversy by spreading the pain of budget cuts equally across constituencies.  Overall, the 
measures of ideology, and to a lesser extent cognitive style, were the statistically dominant 
predictors.  
Some Supplementary Hermeneutic Analyses of Qualitative Interview Data.  
 These interviews had three guiding objectives:  (1) to assess the explanations that 
managers offered for preferring one or another style of making decisions or of structuring 
accountability. Can these free-flowing, stream-of-consciousness, justifications be mapped onto 
the conceptual framework advanced earlier which traces diverging conceptions of good 
judgment to even more fundamental divergences in ideological worldview and in cognitive 
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style? Does a qualitative analysis of the accounts that managers advance for their questionnaire 
responses point us in the same explanatory direction as do the multiple regression analyses 
reported earlier?; (2) to assess the degree to which respondents possessed an intuitive awareness 
of the types of arguments that might be advanced for alternative answers to the questionnaire and 
the degree to which they accepted or disparaged these alternative outlooks; (3) to assess 
managers’ willingness, in principle,  to change their minds if it turned out that some of the 
factual arguments underpinning alternative answers were correct. 
The Allegedly Fundamental Attribution Error.  Managers quite readily acknowledged the role of 
fundamental assumptions about human nature in shaping their openness to subordinates’ 
accounts for failing to satisfy performance expectations. As the regression results led us to 
expect, the less trustworthy and committed employees they thought employees were “to do the 
right thing when no one is looking,” the greater their reluctance to accept accounts.  Managers 
with strong opinions on the perils of over-attribution or under-attribution virtually always had an 
accompanying “horror story.”  Those who deplored over-attribution usually had, ready at hand, 
“there-but-for-the-grace-of-God-go-I” parables in which decent, hardworking folks are 
temporarily overwhelmed by forces outside of their control — bad marriages, disease, 
depression, problem children... — but eventually overcome these forces and become esteemed 
members of the organization, an outcome that would have been impossible if their bosses had not 
been caring and empathic (“open doors, open ears, open minds”).  Sometimes, the managers 
recalled that they themselves were once in the role of the floundering subordinate.  By contrast, 
those most concerned with the perils of under-attribution came conversationally armed with 
stories that cut in the opposite direction:  free-riders-exploit-gullible-managers” parables in 
which shady characters concoct one cockamamie excuse or justification after another for 
non-performance, in the process harming coworkers, the managers in charge, and the 
organization as a whole.  One manager waxed Shakespeare-ian “to be kind I must be cruel.” 
One does no one any favors  by pretending that poor performance is not poor or does not impose 
burdens on others who wind up suffering financial penalties or taking on extra work.  Indeed, a 
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few of these “tough” managers had stories about receiving “Thank you notes” from people they 
had fired.  These reformed “slackards” and “n’er do wells” eventually came to appreciate the 
“wake-up call”;   
(b) Styles of Decision-Making and of Structuring Accountability.  Managers justified their 
preferences for certain styles of decision making, in part,  by invoking competing views of 
human nature.  Some managers, especially conservatives, subscribed to an implicit theory of 
leadership that stressed the importance of always projecting can-do confidence to others and not 
acknowledging errors as long as those errors can be “spun” into sound decisions.  “if you don’t 
believe in yourself, don’t expect others to believe in you” (one defense of over-confidence at the 
level of private thought) and   “Hamlets don’t inspire confidence--you need to show a little 
bluster to get the troops moving” (a defense at the level of private self-presentation). Others, 
especially liberal egalitarians,  subscribed to the view that one gains the long-term respect of 
others by honestly admitting one’s shortcomings and displaying a willingness to heed 
constructive criticism and make timely mid-course corrections -- a distinctive strength, in the 
view of the female managers.   
 But rationales for decision-making styles were also rooted in competing views of the 
challenges confronting the organization.  Some managers, especially traditional conservatives, 
explicitly declared that, in many choice situations, one quickly reaches the point of diminishing 
marginal returns for further information search and analysis whereas other managers, especially 
liberals on the left, were equally explicit about the need to be wary of  “premature closure.”   
Popular refrains among those most skeptical of the value of protracted cognitive assessments of 
problems included “Time is money,” “Real managers make decisions, they don’t talk about 
them,” “On-the-one-hand-and-on-the-other presentations get tiresome very quickly,” and, most 
crudely, “XXXX or get off the pot.”  Those more sympathetic to protracted cognitive 
assessments were equipped with fewer snappy aphorisms but the gist of their comments was 
plain enough:  “Learn to live with uncertainty” and “As soon as you stop hearing that little voice 
in the back of your mind saying ‘you might be wrong,’ you are definitely in trouble.”  These 
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cleavages in managers’ intuitive theories of decision-making thus mirror themes in the now vast 
literature on contingency theories of social cognition and decision making (Chaiken & Trope, 
1999) and the ongoing controversy over when simple heuristics generate as accurate assessments 
and as utility-enhancing decisions as do more complex and effort-demanding methods of making 
up one’s mind (Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999). 
 Radical individualists, with their dislike of rule-bound systems that constrain individual 
initiative, were harshest in their evaluations of the process-accountability manager (“he 
personifies what was wrong with the old approach to running businesses” and “that’s how you 
get $1000 toilet seats”) and most favorable to the outcome-accountability manager (“who pays 
the people working for him the highest compliment: they are smart and they should use their 
smarts”).  Traditional conservatives and liberal egalitarians had more mixed reactions, winding 
up on approximately the same locations on the rating scales but for somewhat different reasons. 
Conservatives rated both managers quite favorably. They resonated to the structure that the 
process-accountability manager gave employees and to the no-nonsense results-orientation of the 
outcome-accountability manager. Liberal egalitarians were also quite favorable to both 
managers. They resonated to the procedural fairness of the process regime and to the autonomy 
to stray from guidelines in the outcome regime--although the latter reaction was qualified by 
concern that the outcome accountability regime might unfairly assume more potential control 
over outcomes than is humanly possible. 
 Traditional conservatives offered the most positive evaluations of the executive who ran 
meetings quickly and directed discussion down the avenues he deemed productive (“isn’t this 
what leaders are supposed to do?”) and the least positive evaluations of the executive who 
adopted a low-profile in group discussions in order to stimulate creativity (“I understand the 
rationale but it looks like dilly-dallying and passing the buck to me”). Radical individualists and 
liberal egalitarians had one of their rare moments of convergence: they both made more positive 
character attributions to the manager who encouraged creativity among subordinates (“ a 
reasonable strategy for encouraging open expression of unpopular opinions”) and less positive 
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attributions to the manager who played a more pro-active role steering the conversation (“he 
seems to want an echo chamber for his own views”); 
(c) Moral boundaries on the thinkable.  Libertarians were least appalled by the life-money 
trade-off, often taking the position that no product is perfectly safe and that the market will 
punish manufacturers who sell particularly unsafe products. The few libertarians who thought the 
company should recall the cars with the potential defect did so not on the ground it was immoral 
to monetize life (a taboo trade-off--Tetlock et al, 1996), but rather on the ground that the 
company may not have been fully honest with its customers about the risks to their safety and 
thus prevented the customers from making money-life trade-offs of their own. Liberal 
egalitarians were most likely to denounce the executive who rejected the recall and their 
irritation focused on the taboo character of the trade-off (“decent human beings just aren’t 
supposed to dollarize human life” and “all too typical, but still, who would want to do business 
with a company like that”). Traditional conservatives fell between the radical individualists and 
the liberal egalitarians. They shared the libertarian view that nothing is perfectly safe (and 
therefore that taboo trade-offs are an inevitable part of life) but shared the liberals’ repugnance 
for the explicitness with which the executive translated lives into money. Unlike the liberals, 
though, who invoked a secular morality to express their repugnance, conservatives tended to use 
the religious language of “sin.” 
 Liberal egalitarians were also most upset about the executive who kept in place a 
premium policy that boosted profits but hurt the poor whereas libertarians and traditional 
conservatives were least bothered. Indeed, libertarians were more positive in their evaluations of 
the executive who retained the profit-maximizing scheme (‘He was honoring his responsibilities 
to his firm and to the shareholders, not pandering to political pressure groups. If he wants to give 
to charity, let him spend his own money, not other people’s). 
(d) Shareholder-Stakeholder Controversy.   Managers for this study were drawn largely from 
the middle ranks of large organizations and had little experience making decisions that required 
answering directly either to shareholder or stakeholder representatives.  Here we thus entered a 
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realm remote from the cognitive and interpersonal challenges that participants faced in their 
everyday lives--answering pressing questions such as “Is this person trustworthy or competent?” 
and  “Should I decide now or give it more thought?”  The tension between the two models of 
corporate governance struck many as a tad contrived. In the words of one centrist skeptic: “I 
don’t get it. How can you please shareholders if  everyone--from the customers to the 
politicians--is furious with you. And how can you keep stakeholders happy if you don’t have any 
money to spread around?” That said, though, the interviews also revealed why ideology still 
predicted preferences for models of corporate accountability. Conservatives and libertarians 
gravitated toward the shareholder model largely for the ideologically correct reason (the primacy 
of property rights--shareholders are owners of the corporation and managers are their agents). 
Conservatives, though, added a cognitive-stylistic reason (an almost visceral distaste for messy 
accountability arrangements that blur lines of authority-- “where’s the boss in this system and 
how will we ever know if he’s doing a good job?”-- and that make it difficult to hold anyone 
accountable for anything-- “where does the buck stop in a set-up like that?”)  Egalitarians also 
arrived at the  “right” answer (the stakeholder model) for largely the “right” political  reasons:  
the need to regulate markets and control negative externalities (“there need to be some checks 
and balances on corporations,” “how else can the little people be heard,” and “what’s wrong with 
a bit more democracy in the workplace”). 
(e) Acknowledging the legitimacy of other perspectives.  Although many respondents were 
aware of arguments against the positions they preferred,  awareness should not be confused with 
tolerance, less still willingness to change one’s mind.  Let’s revisit the controversy over 
corporate governance.  Conservatives understood stakeholder concerns and the necessity of 
taking them into account as a means to the end of profit maximization. But they feared that 
egalitarian efforts to promote the stakeholder vision rested on a fundamental misunderstanding of 
both human nature and of capitalism that would impair long-term growth by enmeshing 
corporate executives in ever more elaborate webs of communitarian regulations (“You can’t do 
anything until the local politicians, labor unions, environmentalists, minority-rights activists, and 
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other assorted opportunists have all had their palms crossed with silver”) and by creating an 
inexhaustible source of excuses for poorly performing managers to put off long-suffering 
shareholders (as one freshly minted MBA pontificated, “the stakeholder model aggravates the 
principal-agent problem at the heart of corporate capitalism -- it gives agents too much wiggle 
room to evade their responsibility to promote the principal’s interest”).  Those on the left often 
understood the value of “incentivizing” management to make the hard choices that are necessary 
to promote growth but felt that the concentration of power and wealth had just become too 
lopsided  (“People who like the shareholder model are just out for number one and they really 
don’t give a damn what happens to anybody else” and, more philosophically, “Society created 
corporations and it has the right to define the rules that they operate under”). 
 Shifting to the micro end of the continuum of questions posed, we again see considerable 
awareness of the reasons for taking a position  on the other side.  Let’s revisit the fundamental 
attribution error.  Conservatives generally conceded that they might sometimes be too hard on 
employees (in this case, too slow to acknowledge situational justifications and excuses) but 
insisted that, although many might think them hard-hearted, they had no difficulty living with 
themselves: “somebody has to draw  a line somewhere” and “it is only human nature to keep 
testing the limits.” Liberals generally acknowledged that they might occasionally be “suckers” 
but thought the balance they were striking was best for themselves (“I can look myself in the 
mirror”) and for the organization (“people who feel respected will respect the company”).  
 In the language of decision theory, most managers--when challenged--acknowledged that 
there was no dominant (trade-off-free) option. But the acknowledgment of  trade-offs was rarely 
spontaneous and tended to have a grudging, perfunctory quality to  it. In the language of 
cognitive-consistency theory, managers seem to have rather thoroughly rationalized their 
preferred styles of thinking, evaluating, and acting. Perceptions of facts and endorsements of 
values seem to have been in close alignment. If a characteristic managerial stance emerged from 
the interviews, it appears to have been belief-system overkill in which participants insisted that 
their preferred working style minimizes the more common type of error (factual claim) and the 
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more serious type of error (close to a moral or value judgment).  Conservatives placed priority 
on minimizing what, for convenience, might be called Type I errors such as failing to hold 
employees accountable for outcomes potentially under their control, exaggerating the complexity 
of fundamentally simple situations, pursuing additional information beyond the point of 
diminishing marginal returns, abandoning sound policies that run into temporary trouble, and 
resisting misguided efforts to make the decision process more democratic, pluralistic and --in 
their view--chaotic.  This policy posture was justified by maintaining that these Type I errors 
were both more likely and more serious than the logically complementary errors that tend to 
preoccupy anti-authoritarians and egalitarians and that do so for roughly complementary reasons. 
                                                                    DISCUSSION                                                                                
Opinions about cognitive biases and organizational correctives hinge on the ideological 
worldview and cognitive style of the beholder.  Most fundamentally, managers of varying 
political persuasions subscribe to markedly different assumptions about human nature that, in 
turn, shape their underlying philosophies of governance.  Traditional conservatives believe that 
“most people” look for and exploit loopholes in accountability systems whereas low scorers on 
factor 1, anti-authoritarians egalitarian, believe that most people will refrain from exploiting 
loopholes as long as they feel fairly treated.  These competing views lead, among other things, 
to different assessments of the “fundamental attribution error.”  Conservatives deem it prudent 
managerial practice to communicate to subordinates a low tolerance for justifications and 
excuses that invoke “situational causes” for conduct that falls short of organizational 
expectations.  People will be more motivated to behave properly if they believe that improper 
behavior will almost automatically tarnish their reputations--a social variant of the legal doctrine 
of strict liability.  From a conservative perspective, failing to hold people responsible for 
outcomes that they could have controlled is arguably a more serious error than holding people 
responsible for outcomes that they could not control (cf. Rodgers, Taylor, & Foreman, 1992).  
By contrast, the anti-authoritarian egalitarians see the “fundamental attribution error” as punitive, 
not prudent.  They disagree with conservatives about both: (a) the frequency with which 
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subordinates will invent specious justifications and fictitious excuses for sub-standard 
performance; (b) the relative importance of avoiding Type I errors (condemning the innocent) 
versus Type II errors (acquitting the guilty), deploring the former error to a greater degree. 
 Traditional conservatives  and high scorers on preference for cognitive closure were also 
much more likely to concur with the sentiment that the world is often far simpler that it initially 
appears to be.  They viewed simplicity as evidence of insight, not simple-mindedness whereas 
low scorers on these scales viewed complexity as evidence of thoughtfulness, not confusion.  
Conservatives also believed that lack of will power and of commitment to principles are common 
human failings whereas anti-authoritarian egalitarians believed that an unwillingness to entertain 
self-critical thoughts and to re-examine basic assumptions are common human failings.  
Extending previous work in political psychology on the connections between political ideology 
and cognitive style, these competing views of the world translated  quite directly into different 
evaluations of a host of putative biases, including the relative perils of over and 
under-confidence, of staying the course versus escalating commitment to sunk costs, of  simple 
versus complex choice heuristics, of pre-emptive self-criticism versus defensive bolstering as 
strategies of coping with accountability, and of directive versus open-ended strategies of 
structuring accountability.   Consider the markedly different evaluations of these two groups of 
“over-confidence” and of “staying the course.”  Traditional conservatives believe that the 
can-do determination and optimism of the over-confident decision-maker more than offsets the 
risk of persevering with a wrong assessment of the situation.  Anti-authoritarian egalitarians 
believe that the capacity of self-critical thinkers to realize quickly that they are on the wrong path 
more than offsets the risk of prematurely abandoning a good policy that has run into temporary 
difficulties.  And, at the level of self-presentation, they think it a bad idea for managers to wear 
a worry-free mask and stress the benefits of keeping coworkers (they dislike the term 
“subordinates”) reasonably fully informed. 
 Ideologically grounded disagreements over human nature and the causal structure of the 
social world parallel in key respects disagreements over how to manage people--at both a micro 
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and macro level.  Traditional conservatives and their high-preference-for-cognitive-closure 
allies approve of managers who communicate their policy preferences clearly to subordinates 
and approve of subordinates who respond equally decisively whereas low scorers on these scales 
see advantages in encouraging open, balanced debate, and cultivating an atmosphere of 
normative ambiguity that keeps coworkers guessing--at least for a while.  Those on the political 
left--and this now includes both anti-authoritarian and anti-libertarian egalitarians-- also offer 
more muted negative evaluations of the manager who responds in a borderline-dishonest, 
loophole-exploiting manner to an accountability regime perceived as unjust.  Some egalitarian 
managers see such behavior as an understandable human bid to “empower oneself” when 
confronted by insensitive or arrogant authorities, with even occasional quasi-Marxist warnings 
about alienating and dehumanizing those lower in the pecking order. 
 At the most macro level, both traditional conservatives and modern libertarians favored 
the monistic regime of accountability solely to shareholders (“It is hard enough to do one thing 
well, less still half a dozen”) whereas the anti-authoritarian and anti-libertarian egalitarians 
embraced the value of accountability to a host of constituencies whose interests would often have 
to be combined in different ways in different situations (“Corporations can’t be allowed just to 
focus on making money” and “There is more to running a society than just efficiency”).   
 Looking back on the full range of ideology/managerial-policy preference correlations, it 
becomes clear that the more macro the issue domain, the more likely traditional conservatives 
and modern libertarians were to agree. As one might expect from the variable loadings in the 
rotated factor matrix, high scorers on both dimensions rose to defend property rights and free 
markets (unless national security/sovereignty issues were implicated, in which case traditional 
conservative support quickly fades) and to oppose what they frequently saw as misguided 
government efforts to help the less competitive and to control externalities. By contrast, the more 
micro the issue, the more likely traditional conservatives and modern libertarians were to be 
temperamentally and stylistically at odds with each other (agreeing strongly with each other only 
on the adaptive value of over-confidence and on the appropriateness of using forbidden base 
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rates). Libertarians tended to be more cognitively flexible (or, if one prefers, unprincipled), less 
preoccupied with precedent, status and hierarchy (or, if one prefers, less loyal to existing 
organizational structures) and more prone to have an upbeat assessment of their fellow humans 
(or, if one prefers, an unrealistic or naive assessment). In certain respects,  libertarians 
resembled anti-authoritarian egalitarians, especially in their lack of enthusiasm for deference and 
obedience to established ways, but breaking abruptly with this outlook when questions tapped 
into broader attitudes toward social equality, markets, and government. And, in certain respects, 
traditional conservatives resembled the anti-libertarian egalitarians, especially in their doubts 
about the self-sufficiency of the isolated individual, but breaking sharply with this camp on the 
more macro questions of societal and economic organization. In brief, this data-set allows us to 
observe in managerial microcosm the cross-cutting tensions documented by survey researchers 
in society at large  between moral conservatism/secular liberalism and economic 
individualism/egalitarianism (Kinder, 1998). If nothing else, the current results demonstrate that 
organizational behaviorists err if they suppose that these deep differences in worldviews do not 
insinuate themselves into a wide array of managerial preferences and practices. there is no 
“Chinese wall” between attitudes toward work and toward politics. 
 Taken as a whole, the pattern of findings suggests the usefulness of revisiting a  much 
maligned but still standing distinction in philosophy and social science: that between facts and 
values. One fruitful hypothesis for follow-up work is that ideological disagreements over 
cognitive biases and organizational correctives can be rooted, to varying degrees,  either in 
competing views of the facts (how likely is this or that inferential error in this type of situation?) 
or in competing values (how important is it to avoid this or that type of inferential error?). 
Disagreements largely rooted in different appraisals of a common reality should, in principle, be 
resolvable via recourse to evidence. From this standpoint, if we could persuade conservatives 
that they have exaggerated the degree to which people are inherently untrustworthy and prone to 
take advantage of empathic managers who are open to situational accounts for non-performance, 
conservatives should become less tolerant of the fundamental attribution error. Or, if we could 
 42 
persuade low-need-for-closure respondents that simple heuristics perform as well as more 
complex decision rules developed through grueling hours of group discussion (cf. Gigerenzer 
and Todd, 1999), these respondents might be quicker to realize that they have reached the point 
of diminishing returns for further deliberation. 
  By contrast, disagreements largely rooted in values should be profoundly resistant to 
change.  Some conservatives may so detest being “suckers” that they are willing to endure a  
high rate of false rejections of employee accounts. Some libertarians might oppose the 
(“confiscatory”) stakeholder model even when confronted by evidence that concessions in this 
direction have no adverse effects on profitability to shareholders. Expropriation is expropriation, 
no matter how prettified. And some egalitarians might well endorse the stakeholder model even 
if they were shown compelling evidence that it reduces profits. Academics who rely on 
evidence-based appeals to change minds when the disagreements are rooted in values may well 
be wasting everyone’s time. 
 Placed in the broadest perspective, the current findings remind us that decision theorists 
are not the only people with strong opinions on the nature of good judgment and rationality.  
Decision theorists characteristically adopt an explicitly prescriptive stance to their subjects of 
study:  there are right answers that can be derived from well-defined axiomatic systems of logic 
such as Bayes theorem or expected utility theory or game theory.  To paraphrase that 
personification of high-handed prescriptivism, John Milton in Paradise Lost, their task is to 
explain the ways of God to man, not the ways of man to God (where we should translate “God” 
for late 20th century audiences as eternal truths of mathematical models of choice). 
 The intuitive theories of good judgment that many managers possess are not anchored in 
mathematical axioms and do not possess in a rigorous hypothetico-deductive structure.  Rather 
these intuitive theories are a conceptual mish-mash:  loose amalgams of hunches that rest on 
speculative assumptions about human nature (how prone are people to exploit loopholes in rules 
and accountability regimes?), the efficacy of simple rules of thumb, and ultimately the nature of 
the good society (how should we structure accountability ground rules so as to strike reasonable 
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balances among such diverse values such as efficiency, autonomy, equality, and fairness?). 
Insofar as this mish-mash  coheres, psychological theory suggests that it does so in response to a 
combination of intrapsychic-consistency pressures to justify one’s working style to oneself--am I 
doing the right thing?-- and self-presentational pressures to justify one’s working style to others 
(cf. Schlenker, 1985). 
 Strictly speaking, there is no direct contradiction between logic and psycho-logic, 
between the formal prescriptivism of decision theory and the informal ideological hunches of 
decision-makers who cope with messy human and organizational realities from day to day.  
There is indeed a rough complementarity.  Formal prescriptive theories make minimal 
assumptions about the external world but extensive assumptions about how decision-makers 
should integrate cues once they have been assigned likelihood or utility values whereas intuitive 
theories make extensive assumptions about the world but are notoriously vague on the precise 
rules for combining elementary beliefs and preferences into final judgments.  But there is also a 
palpable tension.  Micro-economic reductionists might be tempted to argue that disagreements 
grounded in ideology and cognitive style are merely atavistic vestiges of a more primitive social 
order, soon to be swept away by the intensification of competitive market forces that have 
ever-closer-to-zero tolerance for obfuscation, fuzzy thinking, and self-serving posturing.  What 
counts is what works and it is only a matter of time before we are all converted into Bayesian 
belief updaters converging on common truths about human nature, the social world, and how 
best to go about understanding both.  This is a crude but popular variant of the end -of-ideology 
and end-of-history theses (Friedman, 1999; Fukuyama, 1991).  Other scholars, of a more 
pluralistic bent, might stubbornly insist, with Immanuel Kant and Isaiah Berlin, that from the 
crooked timber of humanity, no straight thing can be built, and that it will prove impossible to 
banish ideological posturing and human imperfections from business. Even in perfectly 
competitive markets pulsating signals at the speed of light, there will be numerous niches of ever 
changing shape and size where each ideological worldview can survive, even thrive.  In this 
view, if one is willing to concede that human nature is at least as bafflingly complex  as  that 
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conceptual prototype of economic efficiency, the stock market, where bullish and bearish 
observers seem fated to co-exist indefinitely in dialectical interdependence, why should one 
resist the notion that an equally broad spectrum of managerial opinion on human nature will 
prove sustainable in the face of even ferocious market competition? 
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Table 1 
Variable Loadings in Rotated (Oblimin) Factor Matrix from  
 
Maximum Likelihood Analysis 
 
Variables     Authoritarian   Market 
      Conservative         Libertarianism 
       
Self-identification as conservative     +0.22   +0.19 
           
Untrustworthiness of other people     +0.38   +0.04 
 
Can count on employees doing right     -0.35     0.00 
thing when no one looking 
 
Underlings understand a lot       -0.22   +0.02 
 
Even the strong and need help     +0.14   -0.27 
 
“Keep it simple, stupid”      +0.41   +0.08 
 
Embarrassed by talk of “subordinates”    -0.27   -0.10 
 
System is meritocratic     +0.30   +0.26 
 
Obedience is an under-rated virtue     +0.29     0.00 
 
Don’t mix business goals with social justice    +0.25   +0.41 
 
Society owes much courageous innovators    +0.16   +0.49 
          
Avoiding exploitation less important     -0.37   +0.02 
than joint gain 
       
People are rudder-less without leaders    +0.43   -0.05 
 
Free markets promote prosperity    +0.21   +0.46 
      
Need government to check impact of   -0.20    -0.35 
free markets on inequality/environment 
 
Government creates more problems than    +0.24   +0.38 
it solves   
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Table 2 
Multiple Regression Predictors of Evaluations of Micro, Meso and Macro Scenarios 
 
Scenarios    Key Predictors (Standardized Coefficients) 
  
                           Traditional       Modern             Need     
                                             Conservatism    Libertarianism  Closure       
Cognitive Biases 
 
Overattribution ( R2=0.25)                  = +0.41**       = +0.10       = +0.30*   
 
 Underattribution  (R2=0.24)               = -0.36**        = -0.07       = -0.24**   
 
Over-confidence  (R2=0.22)                = +0.25**       = +0.23*     = +0.27**  
(Private Thought)  
 
Under-confidence  (R2=0.20)              = -0.29**        = -0.22*      = -0.23**   
(Private Thought)  
 
Over-Confidence (R2=0.19)  =+0.23* =+0.22* =+0.03 
(Public Self-presentation) 
 
Sunk costs trump staying the course = -0.29*   =+0.01 =-0.25 
(R2=0.18) 
 
Complex heuristics trump simple = -0.35*   =-0.02 =-0.32* 
(R2=0.25) 
 
Use Morally Suspect Base Rate = +0.25*   =+ 0.27* = 0.02 
(R2=0.17) 
 
Make Taboo Trade-Off (R2=0.12) = +0.08   = +0.31* = -0.01          
 
Coping with Accountability 
 
Pre-emptive    (R2=0.23)          = -0.33**         = +0.02      = -0.34**    
self-criticism  
 
Defensive     (R2=0.22)             = +0.26**        = +0.01     = +0.23*      
Bolstering  
 
Directive Accountability (R2=0.15) = +0.22*   =+ 0.03 = +0.19* 
 
Open-ended Accountability (R2=0.14) = -0.23*   = 0.00 = -0.19* 
 
Process Accountability (R2=0.11) = 0.03   = -0.25* =+ 0.13 
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Outcome Accountability (R2=0.13) = +0.14   =+ 0.28* = +0.09 
 
Diffusion of pain/  (R2=0.24)  = -0.28**        = -0.32**     = -0.07         
minimize protest 
 
Concentrate cuts/  (R2=0.23)    = +0.24*          = +0.33**   = -0.10        
maximize efficiency 
 
Protest     (R2=0.19)               = -0.26**    = -0.18      = -0.14        
 
Exit (R2=0.18)               = +0.02           = +0.38**  = +0.02        
 
Loophole     (R2=0.29)   = -0.34**        = -0.33**   = 0.00         
Exploitation 
 
Loyalty     (R2=0.17)    = +0.26*    = +0.18*    = +0.02       
 
Designing Accountability Systems 
 
6A: Shareholder  (R2=0.31)   = +0.31**        = +0.39**   = +0.10     
 
6B: Stakeholder  (R2=0.27)      = -0.29**         = -0.35**   = -0.08      
 
7A: Hierarchical  (R2=0.18)     =+0.30**        = -0.04        = +0.26*   
       filtering   
 
7B: Multiple (R2=0.17)            = -0.20*           =  +0.01     = -0.28*     
       advocacy 
 
**significant at .01 level 
*significant at .05 level 
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Table 3 
 
Mean Evaluations of Scenarios 
 
Scenarios                   Bottom and Top Tertiles  
                  
         Low/High               Low/High            
Low/High 
                 Conservatism            Libertarianism         Need 
Closure  
 
Overattribution    3.10 vs. 5.12 3.86 vs. 4.03  3.52 vs. 5.03 
 
Underattribution    5.21 vs. 3.99 4.39 vs. 4.32  4.83 vs. 3.86 
 
Over-confidence    4.02 vs. 5.22 4.35 vs. 4.91  4.21 vs. 5.03 
(Private Thought) 
 
Under-confidence    5.08 vs. 3.80 4.28 vs. 3.74  4.71 vs. 3.72 
(Private Thought) 
 
Over-confidence    3.86 vs. 6.02 4.12 vs. 5.73  4.41 vs. 5.55 
(Public posturing) 
 
Sunk costs trump    6.02 vs. 3.52 5.05 vs. 5.37  6.15 vs. 3.71 
staying the course 
 
Complex heuristics    6.33 vs. 3.66 5.14 vs. 5.01  5.99 vs. 3.18 
trump simple 
 
Use morally suspect    3.22 vs. 5.21 3.15 vs. 5.35  3.66 vs. 4.08 
base rate 
 
Make taboo trade-off    4.46 vs. 4.71 3.85 vs. 5.53  4.03 vs. 4.25 
 
Pre-emptive self-criticism   5.39 vs. 4.21 4.78 vs. 4.98  5.54 vs. 4.22 
 
Defensive Bolstering    4.05 vs. 5.47 4.70 vs. 4.91  4.04 vs. 5.54 
 
Directive Accountability   4.72 vs. 6.05 5.15 vs. 5.25  4.42 vs. 5.89 
 
Open-Ended Accountability   5.42 vs. 4.59 5.08 vs. 5.03  5.61 vs. 4.48 
 
Process Accountability  5.23 vs. 5.33  5.26 vs. 3.88  5.14 vs. 5.41 
 
Outcome Accountability   4.84 vs. 5.45 4.32 vs. 5.75  5.08 vs. 5.24 
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Diffusion of pain/    4.85 vs. 2.80 5.04 vs. 2.71  3.76 vs. 4.03 
minimize protest 
 
Concentrate cuts/    3.29 vs. 5.35 3.07 vs. 5.65  4.08 vs. 4.25 
maximize efficiency 
 
Protest     4.62 vs. 3.13 4.14 vs. 3.65  4.33 vs. 4.20 
 
Exit      4.13 vs. 4.25 3.49 vs. 5.45  4.12 vs. 4.17 
 
Loophole Exploitation   3.76 vs. 2.83 3.80 vs. 2.70  3.53 vs. 3.55 
 
Loyalty     4.93 vs. 5.38 4.62 vs. 5.17  4.31 vs. 4.86 
 
Shareholder     3.37 vs. 5.21 3.16 vs. 5.37  4.20 vs. 4.31 
 
Stakeholder     5.52 vs. 3.06 5.23 vs. 3.26  4.40 vs. 4.10 
 
Hierarchical filtering    3.37 vs. 4.89 3.90 vs. 3.83  3.41 vs. 4.26 
 
Multiple advocacy    5.45 vs. 4.21 4.73 vs. 4.59  4.99 vs. 4.32 
 
Higher scores indicate a more positive evaluation of the manager, coping strategy, or 
accountability regime. 
